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INTRODUCTION 
The University goes to great lengths to argue for the immunity of geneticists, 
regardless of whether their negligent or intentional conduct causes injury to innocent 
parents. But this Court has consistently rejected such immunity. As this Court stated 
The failure to recognize a cause of action against a physician who 
negligently performs [] procedures [affecting reproductive choice] would be a 
grant of absolute immunity to a physician whose negligence results in injury to the 
patient. We decline to grant such immunity. We see no reason why a physician 
who performs such [procedures] should be held to a lesser standard of care than a 
physician or surgeon who performs any other [] procedure. Such a ruling could 
lead to a decrease in the standard of care, and would leave victims of professional 
negligence without a remedy. 
C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504, 508 (Utah 1988) (quotations omitted). 
Regardless of the University's attempts to obfuscate the purpose of Utah Code 
Ann. 78-11-23 - 25 (the "Act") and demonize Wood/Borman as parents, the Act remains 
unconstitutional. The University is unable to establish that the Act, which eliminated an 
existing legal remedy, passes the Berry Test. The University is also unable to overcome 
the Act's invalid purpose. Finally, regardless of whether Wood/Borman would have 
aborted, they plead viable causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
and failure to obtain informed consent. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE BURDEN IS ON THE UNIVERSITY TO ESTABLISH THE ACT'S 
CONSTITUTIONALITY. 
The University argues that the Act should be blessed with a strong presumption of 
constitutional validity. The express and implicit holdings of Utah courts reject this 
presumption in this matter since this case implicates the Open Courts Clause. 
The University correctly notes that this Court has never directly stated in a 
majority opinion that there is a presumption that a statute limiting rights protected by the 
Open Courts Clause is unconstitutional, thereby placing the burden to show that the Berry 
Test is satisfied upon those seeking to uphold the challenged statute. However, this shift 
of presumption can be seen from a careful reading of Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill 
P.2d 670 (Utah 1985); Sun Valley Waterbeds v. Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 
1989); andHorton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989). In each of 
those cases, this Court, without so stating, shifted the burden of establishing 
constitutionality to the proponent of the legislation. In other words, the statute was 
presumed unconstitutional until the Berry Test could be satisfied. 
This practice of shifting the burden of constitutionality to the legislative proponent 
has been expressed by this Court in numerous non-majority opinions. See, e.g., Hipwell 
v. Sharp, 858 P.2d 987, 988 n.4 (Utah 1993) (finding that a majority of the court agreed 
that statutes implicating the open courts clause must be analyzed under a heightened level 
of scrutiny for constitutional purposes); Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 
348, 368 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in part) ("Because the interests at stake 
are specifically protected by the constitution, the presumption of validity that normally 
attaches to legislative action must be reversed ")• 
In fact, the implication from this Court to shift the burden has been so strong that 
the Utah Court of Appeals held that the legislative proponent bears the burden of 
establishing the Act's constitutionality and that the normal presumptions do not apply. 
As the Utah Court of Appeals held, "because this statute of limitations impacts the 
constitutional right... protected under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution, the 
usual presumption of validity does not control our review of this statute." Currier v. 
Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1362 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added), cert, denied, 870 
P.2d 957 (1993). See also, Velarde v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Com'n, 831 P.2d 123,128 
n. 8 (noting that "the burden shifts to the [legislative] proponent to demonstrate the 
statute's constitutionality" where the Open Courts Clause is at issue). 
Contrary to the University's contention, there is substantial justification for 
providing a heightened level of scrutiny to this constitutional right, thereby checking the* 
Legislature's power to modernize the law. "The constitution's drafters recognized that 
the normal political processes would not always protect the common law rights of all 
citizens for injuries...." Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19 at 128, 5 P.3d 616, 625 (Utah 
2000) (quotations omitted). The drafter's rightfully believed that the political processes 
would not protect those who are injured in "their persons, property, or reputations since 
they are generally isolated in society, belong to no identifiable group, and rarely are able 
to rally the political process to their aid" Berry, 111 P.2d at 676. Accordingly, the 
framers included the Open Courts Clause as a check upon legislative power. 
This Court simply "cannot ignore the fact that the framers of our Constitution -
based on the experience of a number of other states - placed the open courts provision in 
the Utah Constitution to protect important individual rights against legislative power." 
Horton, 785 P.2d at 1093. Those important rights being "[t]he right of access to the 
courts and to a civil remedy to redress injuries, which Article I, section 11 protects, 
[which are] fundamental in Anglo-American law." Lyon, 2000 UT 19 at <[28, 5 P.3d at 
625. Because of the fundamental nature of the right to access the courts, statutes which 
limit this right are, and should be, subject to higher scrutiny. A component of this 
scrutiny is shifting the burden to the legislative proponent to establish the statute's 
constitutionality. 
H. THE ACT ABROGATED AN EXISTING LEGAL REMEDY. 
The University argues that the Open Courts Clause is not at issue in this matter 
because the Act did not abrogate an existing remedy, namely wrongful birth. To support 
this contention, the University relies upon Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987) and 
C.S. v. Nielson, 767 P.2d 504 (Utah 1988). As will be shown below, the University's 
reliance is misplaced and Payne and Nielson in fact substantiate that the Act abrogated an 
existing remedy. 
A. The Nielson Decision Does Not Stand For the Proposition that 
Wrongful Birth Is Not An Ordinary Medical Malpractice Action. 
The University does not dispute that a legal remedy for medical malpractice, 
including negligent diagnosis, existed in Utah prior to the Act's passage. Such a claim 
required the plaintiff to establish (1) the existence of a duty; (2) the breach of that duty; 
(3) which causes (4) an injury to the plaintiff. Payne, 743 P.2d at 188. A thorough 
examination of the wrongful birth cause of action reveals that it requires proof of these 
same elements and is no different than any other claim for medical malpractice/ 
negligence.1 
1. The Health Care Provider Owed and Could Breach A Duty. 
This Court held that a health care provider, including a geneticist, has a duty to his 
or her patients to provide genetic counseling within reasonable standards of professional 
performance. Payne, 743 P.2d at 189. The Payne Court specifically held that 
It is now possible for prospective parents to know, well in advance of birth, of the 
risk of congenital defects in children not yet conceived. Courts accordingly have 
recognized that physicians who perform testing and provide advice relevant to the 
constitutionally guaranteed procreative choice, or whose actions could reasonably 
be said to give rise to a duty to provide such testing or advice, have a 
corresponding obligation to adhere to reasonable standards of professional 
performance. 
Id. at 189 (quotations omitted). The court then concluded, "there was a duty to the 
parents — " Id. Therefore, wrongful birth, like any other medical malpractice action, 
imposes a duty upon the health care provider. 
This duty can easily be breached if the counseling falls below the reasonable 
standard of care, as is alleged in this matter. The Payne Court recognized the possibility 
1
 To the extent the University argues that only causes of action existing at the time of 
Utah Statehood are protected by the Open Courts Clause, the University is wrong. This 
Court rejected such an assertion stating the "proposition that [Open Courts Clause] 
should be construed to protect only those rights and remedies that were recognized under 
the common law at the time of statehood is not supported by Berry v. Beech Aircraft... 
or by its progeny ...." Day v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 980 P.2d 1171, 1185 
(Utah 1999). Rather, the determination of whether an injured person has been denied a 
remedy "should be decided by reference to the general law of rights and remedies at the 
time that the Legislature abrogates a remedy." Id. at 1184. 
of breach when it stated that that "there was a duty to the parents which the doctors may 
have breached " Id. 
2. The Breach Can Cause Injury. 
The University's primary contention is that the wrongful birth injury is different 
from that in any other medical malpractice case. Essentially, the University's argument 
is two-fold, (1) that the existence of life - even with severe defects - cannot constitute an 
injury and is the only injury in wrongful birth cases; and (2) that the measure of damages 
is precluded in Utah by Nielson. 161 P.2d 504. However, the University's argument 
lacks an understanding of wrongful birth jurisprudence and misapplies Nielson, and 
should therefore be ignored. 
a* The injury in wrongful birth is not exclusively dependent upon 
the assertion that the child should not have been born. 
Contrary to the University's contention, in a wrongful birth claim "all damages 
[do not] depend on the assertion that the child should not have been born." University at 
10. As this Court noted in Payne, wrongful birth is brought by the parents of a severely 
defective child "against a physician who negligently fails to inform them, in a timely 
fashion, of an increased possibility that the mother will give birth to such a child, thereby 
depriving the parents of the choice to make an informed decision as to whether to have a 
child." 743P.2datl87n. 1. (citation omitted). The Payne court recognized that the 
injury was not the life of the child, but the lost opportunity to make an informed 
reproductive choice. 
In fact, the injury in a wrongful birth claim is not the life of the child, but is the 
loss of opportunity to chose whether to terminate the pregnancy. The damages flowing 
from that injury are incurred by the parents, not the child and include the emotional, 
physical and financial impact of being denied the opportunity to terminate the pregnancy. 
The injury is simply not life itself. That is a wrongful life claim. See Liddington v. 
Burns, 916 F. Supp. 1127,1130-31 (W.D. Okla. 1995) (noting injury is not life of child, 
but effect of physician's negligence in denying parents right to informed choice); Reed v. 
Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145,1150 (Md. 1993); Vicarro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8,10 n. 
3 (Mass. 1990); Garrison v. Med Cent, of Delaware, Inc., 581 A.2d 288 (Del. 1990) 
("the resulting injury to the plaintiff parents lies in their being deprived of the opportunity 
to make an informed decision . . . " ) . 
In addition to the loss of reproductive choice, the injury may be the emotional pain 
of witnessing the birth of the defective child when a healthy child was expected and 
assured by the medical provider or the physical and emotional pain associated with going 
through with a pregnancy that would have been terminated had the parents been informed 
of the child's true genetic makeup. See Nielson, 767 P.2d at 505-06 (recognizing that a 
mother could be awarded physical and emotional damages for going through with a 
pregnancy she did not want). None of these injuries is dependent upon the life of the 
child or terminating the pregnancy. 
b. Nielson does not eliminate damages. 
In Nielson, this Court held that a wrongful pregnancy cause of action exists in 
Utah. 767 P.2d at 516 (Utah 1988). A plurality of Nielson also stated that in wrongful 
pregnancy actions, "the projected costs of rearing a normal, healthy child may not be 
recovered." Id. The University argues that this plurality decision establishes that 
wrongful birth is not an ordinary medical malpractice claim because there are no 
available damages. Again, the University is incorrect. 
First, as noted above, the injury in wrongful birth is not the existence of the child. 
Rather, it is, among others, the lost opportunity to make an informed reproductive choice. 
Even accepting that the Nielson plurality limiting damages was and remains sound law, 
Wood/Borman suffered an injury and damages. The damages in a wrongful birth cause 
of action are not the cost of rearing a normal, healthy child. Rather, "[i]t is generally 
recognized that, in a wrongful birth action, parents may recover the extraordinary costs 
necessary to treat the birth defect and any additional medical or educational costs 
attributable to the birth defect...." Keel v. Banach, 624 So.2d 1022, 1030 (Ala. 1993). 
See also, Arche v. U.S. Dept. of Army, 798 P.2d 477,481 (Kan. 1990) (holding expenses 
caused by the child's handicaps may be recovered, but not those expenses natural to 
raising any child); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 881 (W.V. Ct. App. 1985). 
Moreover, damages need not be given only for the costs of raising an unhealthy 
child, but may be based upon a variety of grounds including the deprivation of a mother's 
opportunity to make a procreative choice, the costs of pregnancy and delivery and 
emotional distress. See also, Wrongful Life Actions, Utah L. Rev. 1994 221, 222. Again, 
these damages are exclusive of the child's life and certainly exclusive of the cost of 
raising a healthy child. This rationale is entirely in line with Nielson, in that the parents 
do not receive damages for the life of a healthy, normal child. 
Second, the Nielson Plurality did not find that no cause of action existed for the 
birth of the child, but rather that damages were limited. Id. at 576. There is a 
fundamental difference between eliminating a cause of action and limiting potential 
damages. For example, a person injured by government negligence, which is covered 
under the governmental immunity act, may be without legal remedy. That is not the 
same, however, as a person who can bring a cause of action against the government, but 
whose damages may be capped by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-34. One has a cause of 
action, but limited damages, while the other is without remedy. A similar result occurs 
when carrying out the Nielson Plurality to its logical conclusion. A remedy for wrongful 
pregnancy existed, but the amount or nature of damages was merely limited. 
Third, Nielson's limitation on damages does not apply to this matter. As noted 
above, the Nielson plurality held that "the projected costs of rearing a normal, healthy 
child may not be recovered." Id. at 516 (emphasis added). In this matter, unfortunately, 
there is not a normal, healthy child. Mary Borman was born with severe handicaps, 
including mental retardation. Thus, the Nielson Plurality's limitation on damages for 
"normal, healthy" children is simply irrelevant to this case. Goldberg v. Ruskin, 411 
N.E.2d 530, 536 (111. Ct. App. 1984) ("The reasons for denying the costs of rearing a 
normal and healthy child should not prevent the parents of an abnormal child who 
establish liability from recovering expenses reasonably necessary for the care and 
treatment of their child's physical impairment."). 
Thus, because a wrongful birth cause of action requires duty, breach, causation 
and damages, it is the same as any other negligence based malpractice claim. Those 
courts addressing wrongful birth have generally recognized this. Garrison, 581 A.2d at 
290 (Del. 1990) ('The cause of action need not be characterized as "wrongful birth" since 
it falls within the realm of traditional tort and medical malpractice law"); Keel v. Banach, 
624 So.2d 1022,1026 (Ala. 1993); Liddington v. Burns, 916 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (W.D. 
Okla. 1995); Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471,478 (7th Cir. 1981); Greco v. United 
States, 893 P.2d 345, 348 (Nev. 1995). Hence, wrongful birth is nothing more than a 
medical malpractice claim sounding in negligence. A claim that was without doubt in 
existence at the time of the Act's passage. 
B. Payne Recognizes Wrongful Birth. 
Even if wrongful birth is not a ordinary medical malpractice claim, this Court in 
Payne, without an express holding, recognized wrongful birth as an available cause of 
action. 743 P.2d at 189-90. Wood/Borman recognizes and does not dispute that the 
Payne Court stated that it assumed but did not expressly hold that Utah should recognize 
the wrongful birth cause of action. Notwithstanding, the logical conclusion from its 
opinion is that the Payne Court did just that. 
This Court found that "there was a duty to the parents which the doctors may have 
breached " Id. Finding a duty and accepting a possible breach, the Payne Court 
concluded that the "[p]arents had a remedy against the state defendants for injuries 
arising out of the negligent acts of State employees " Id. at 190. Finally, the Court 
held that" the parents were not denied the guarantees of article I, section 11 because 
they still had an opportunity to seek redress in the courts." Id. (emphasis added). 
The reason the parents could seek redress for wrongful birth was because the Court had 
expressly held that a duty existed from a geneticist to a patient, a breach could result 
therefrom, and implicitly held that the parents had a viable cause of action for what we 
now term "wrongful birth." 
In finding that the parents had a remedy for their injuries, the Court was not acting 
in a vacuum. Regardless of whether the Court stated "wrongful birth exists in Utah", the 
Court stated that the Payne plaintiffs could have brought their wrongful birth cause of 
action, had they done so timely. In short, the Court determined that a duty existed and 
that a breach was actionable, but that it had to be brought in compliance with the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Id. In other words, a wrongful birth cause of action 
existed. 
C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress/Informed Consent Were 
Available, 
Even if wrongful birth was not a viable cause of action in 1983, negligent 
infliction of emotional distress and failure to obtain informed consent clearly were. 
Therefore, the Berry Test is implicated, because by the University's own argument, the 
Act abrogates these remedies in this matter as well. 
III. THE ACT VIOLATES THE BERRY TEST BECAUSE NO CLEAR SOCIAL 
EVIL EXISTED IN UTAH IN 1983. 
Recognizing that abortion cannot be a social evil, and therefore without a social 
evil identified by the Legislature, the University is left to invent one. This invented evil 
comes from a tortured reading of the preamble to the Act, which states that "it is the 
public policy of this state to encourage all persons to respect the right to life of all other 
persons, regardless of age, development, condition or dependency, including all 
handicapped persons and all unborn persons." Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-23. The 
University interprets this to mean that the social evil to be eliminated "is the 
stigmatization of the disabled and of unwanted children in general." University at 12, 
This so-called evil fails for several reasons. 
First, wrongful birth does not discriminate nor label the child as unwanted as the 
University claims. This was succinctly summarized in Justice Durham's concurrence in 
Nielson, which stated 
Parents seek damages, not because they do not love and want to keep the 
unplanned [or disabled] child, but because the direct, foreseeable and natural 
consequences of the physician's negligence has forced burdens upon the parents 
which they sought to avoid " 
767 P.2d at 508 (citations omitted). In this matter, Wood/Borman love their child dearly 
and she has brought them much happiness. However, she has brought increased expenses 
and costs, both emotional and monetary, that Wood/Borman was not anticipating. A 
cause of action for the recovery of these increased costs does not imply that the child is 
unwanted or not loved or is discriminated against, but that the "resultant birth [] 
cause [ed] hardship to family members due to the diminution of family resources rather 
than the birth itself." Id. 
In fact, the Nielson Court refused to recognize the very "social evil" the University 
claims the Act attempts to eliminate. Adopting wrongful pregnancy as a cause of action, 
an action in which the parents essentially claim that a healthy child should not have been 
born or even conceived, this Court stated that parents should be allowed "to recover 
damages which they prove are the natural, probable, and direct consequences of 
professional negligence [and that such actions] neither contravenes the policy of placing 
high value on human life nor necessarily encourages increased litigation in this area." 
767 P.2d at 509. In other words, it was not an evil to bring a claim that a pregnancy, and 
thus the resulting child, should not have occurred. In fact, the Nielson parents were 
entitled to damages as the result of the negligence in allowing such an unwanted birth. 
Wrongful birth is no different. The wrongful birth child has no less rights nor is viewed 
any less favorably than the child in Nielson, whose parents did not want said pregnancy. 
Thus, the "evil" the University claims is no evil at all. 
Moreover, this "evil" certainly was not identified by the Legislature as existing in 
1983. The Utah Legislature never identified discrimination as the evil to be eliminated. 
Nor does the University point to any evidence establishing that discrimination against 
handicapped children was a problem facing Utah at the time of the Act's passage. Under 
Utah law, absent a clear showing that the evil existed in Utah, the claimed evil cannot 
form the justification to abrogate a legal remedy. See Day, 980 P.2d at 1186; Lee v. 
Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 583-88 (Utah 1993) (holding legislative abrogation of remedies 
based on economic and social problems that had occurred in other states, but not in Utah 
to be unconstitutional). Therefore, the University's claimed evil is insufficient to satisfy 
the Berry Test. 
IV. THE ACT DOES NOT SUBSTANTIALLY ADVANCE THE SOCIAL EVIL 
IDENTIFIED BY THE UNIVERSITY. 
Under the Berry Test, the Act must "reasonably and substantially advance the 
stated purpose of the statute." Berry, 111 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah 1985). Even accepting the 
"social evil" identified by the University, the Act does not reasonably and substantially 
advance the elimination of this so-called evil. 
The University makes no attempt to demonstrate how the Act achieves the so-
called legislative purpose by eliminating a valid cause of action. In a similar situation, 
this Court stated that "since such claims are generally limited to negligent... counseling, 
it appears unlikely that there will be great proliferation of the same. At any rate, the 
potential for some increase in litigation cannot justify refusal to recognize a valid cause 
of action." Nielson, 767 P.2d at 507. Because this cause of action is so remote, there will 
not be a rash of claims that label children as unwanted or defective. 
Additionally, the Act will not prevent children involved in wrongful birth claims 
from learning that "society would prefer not to be burdened" with him or her. Wrongful 
birth claims are limited to children born with grave defects, including, as in this matter, 
mental retardation. The sad truth is that Mary Borman will never understand this 
litigation or its purpose. Accordingly, the Act does nothing to spare her feelings, but 
does eliminate the opportunity for her to have access to funds to ensure that she receives 
a proper upbringing and receives the extra-ordinary services and care that her condition 
necessitates. 
Moreover, even if this were a legitimate purpose - eliminating causes of action 
that label children unwanted - it could be achieved by a far less intrusive means. As in 
Nielson, the claim could be brought anonymously through the parents' initials only, with 
no identity revealed. In fact, this Court already has endorsed such a principle. As the 
Nielson Court stated, "[bjcause of the emotional, moral, and philosophical implications 
inherent in cases such as this one, styling the case using the plaintiffs initials will help to 
preserve the sanctity of the family involved." 767 P.2d at 505 n.2. Essentially, no one 
would know the identity of the child or the parents. No one could label the child or 
discriminate against him or her. The cause of action could still exist, the child protected 
and the so-called "evil" eliminated without denying Wood/Borman's rights protected by 
the Open Courts Clause. 
Finally, if anything, the Act encourages negligence and is counterproductive in 
terms of public safety. The District Court for South Carolina summarized this best, 
stating 
Society has an interest in insuring that genetic testing is properly performed 
and interpreted. The failure to properly perform or interpret an amniocenteses 
could cause either the abortion of a healthy fetus, or the unwanted birth of... [an 
afflicted] child . . . Either of these occurrences is contrary to public policy . . . The 
recognition of a cause of action for negligence in the performance of genetic 
testing would encourage the accurate of performance of such testing by penalizing 
physicians who fail to observe customary standards of good medical practice. 
Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544, 551 (1981). This Court has long recognized 
that the threat of lawsuit is an effective "stick" to ensure that the citizens of Utah receive 
proper medical care and treatment. Immunizing geneticists reduces the quality of care 
and is against public policy. 
The University's argument that the threat of peer review and loss of license deters 
malpractice is naive. The administrative bodies the University suggest should regulate 
geneticists are routinely made up of other physicians who are loath to discipline their 
own. Likewise, the bodies are unable to award damages to injured patients, which 
reduces their effectiveness because injured patients see little benefit in pursuing 
administrative remedies. All in all, these problems have led many to conclude that such 
panels are ineffective and of little deterrence. See Andrew K. Dolan & Nicole D. Urban, 
The Determinates of the Effectiveness of Medical Disciplinary Boards: 1960-1977,7 
LAW & HUM. BEHAF., 203,215-17 (1983). 
In short, the Act does not substantiate its stated purpose. Moreover, it is likely to 
reduce the standard of medical care within this state. Where an Act is counterproductive 
it may be unconstitutional, as it neither reasonably nor substantially advances a legitimate 
legislative purpose. See, e.g., Berry, 111 P.2d at 683 (finding statute unconstitutional in 
part because it encouraged shoddy workmanship rather than promoting public safety). 
Since the Act actually encourages negligence, it fails the Berry Test. 
V. THE ACT'S STATED PURPOSE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SURVIVE 
THE "PURPOSE" PRONG OF CASEY. 
The University does not dispute that a statute with "the purpose . . . of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion" is invalid. Casey v. 
Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). Regardless of a statute's effect, if the 
purpose is to impede abortion, the statute is unconstitutional. Attempting to avoid any 
implication of abortion, the University asserts that because the Act states that its purpose 
is to encourage respect of disabled life - an arguably proper purpose - no further analysis 
is needed. While it is understandable that the University does not want this Court to 
discover or examine the Utah Legislature's true, unconstitutional purpose for the Act, the 
University ignores the appropriate test for determining whether a statute has a 
constitutionally improper purpose. 
TXQ1Q 1 
It is generally true that legislative history is relevant only where statutory language 
is ambiguous. However, this rule does not apply where the purpose of a statute 
determines its constitutionality. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has ignored the 
general rule in three specific areas, including: abortion, establishment clause and voting 
districts. In each of these areas, the Supreme Court has outlined a constitutional test 
requiring an analysis of the statute's purpose. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 
586(1987). 
It is well established that where the court must determine if a statute has an 
improper purpose the court should look beyond the statute's unambiguous language to 
the legislative history. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594-95, (noting finding of improper 
purpose is determined by analyzing the statute on its face as well as its legislative 
history). This is especially true when analyzing the legislative purpose under the Casey 
Purpose Prong. See generally, Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112,1116(10th Cir. 
1996) ("[a] forbidden purpose may be gleaned both from the structure of the legislation 
and from examination of the process that led to its enactment."); Richmond Medical 
Center For Women v. Gilmore, 55 F.Supp.2d 441, 486 (E.D.Va. 1999) ("under Casey, the 
legislative intent behind the enactment is a pertinent inquiry."). 
In fact, the Supreme Court has even noted that a court need not accept a 
legislature's express and unambiguously stated purpose if the legislative history shows 
that the proffered purpose was no_t sincere, but merely a sham. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 586 
(finding statute unconstitutional after legislative history revealed that legislature's stated 
purpose in statute was not sincere). The Tenth Circuit used a similar legislative analysis 
to strike down Utah's abortion statute. Bangerter, 102 F.3d at 1116. The statute at issue 
in Bangerter included a preamble that expressly declared the statute's purpose as 
protecting the lives and right to life of unborn children, a purpose similar to that of the 
Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-301. This stated purpose was both proper and 
unambiguous. 
Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit did not end its analysis of the legislature's purpose 
simply at the unambiguous language of the preamble. Bangerter, 102 F.3d at 1116. 
Rather, the court looked specifically to the process that led to the statute's enactment. 
Because the legislature's true intent - not that expressed for constitutional purposes in the 
preamble - was to prevent the abortion of non-viable fetuses, the Tenth Circuit declared 
the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 1117. 
Similarly, in this matter, as the University noted, the Act expresses an allegedly 
proper and unambiguous purpose. However, this Court's analysis does not end there. 
Instead, the Court must look to the legislative history to discover if the expressed purpose 
was in fact the true purpose or merely a sham. The evidence is overwhelming that the 
purpose was to impede and place an obstacle in the path of those choosing to abort. 
The Act itself reveals that its only intent was to prevent and or reduce abortion. 
The principal drafter of the Act did not hide this purpose. He declared that the Act was 
intended to prevent physicians from informing parents as to the health of the fetus, 
thereby preventing the parents from choosing to abort. Wrongful Life Actions, 1994 
Utah L. Rev. 221, 224 n.748-52 and accompanying text; William Shane Topham, 
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 833, 858 n. 153 (noting that 
Professor Wardle indicated "purpose of the Act [was] to codify, in Utah, the rights of 
individuals to refuse to provide, perform or undergo nontherapeutic abortion or 
contraceptive sterilization operations that contradict the individual's religious beliefs or 
moral convictions."). Legislators supported this rationale behind the Act. See Second 
Reading S. 149,45th Utah Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 28,1983) (statement of Sen. Swann) 
("the bill is a good bill, that it shouldn't put pressure on a doctor for instance to actually 
be encouraged to create an abortion in order to avoid a handicap or a possible handicap 
and in effect deny someone the opportunity to live."). 
These statements, coupled with those discussed in Wood/Borman's Opening Brief, 
reveal that the Act's true purpose and driving force was abortion, not discrimination. The 
University's claim that these statements are unreliable should be ignored because they 
come from politicians trying to "obtain political advantage" has been rejected by the 
United States Supreme Court. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594-95. This Court must look 
beyond the Act's stated purpose, to the actual purpose the legislature had in mind when 
passing the Act. This actual purpose, gleaned from the text and the legislative history, is 
clear. So clear, that at the district court level, the University admitted the true purpose 
when it stated, "[t]he Act is not only rationally related but narrowly tailored to achieve 
the State's interest in protecting fetus' from abortion solely because of their physical 
condition." (R. 80 (emphasis added)). 
Despite its best efforts, the University cannot hide the Act's true intent. A proper 
constitutional analysis of purpose requires this Court to look not only to the Act's 
language, but also to the legislative history surrounding its passage. After performing 
this analysis, the Court can only find, as the University recognized, that the Act was 
intended to protect fetuses by eliminating abortion and informed choice. This purpose is 
invalid and so too is the Act. 
VI. THE ACT CONSTITUTES STATE ACTION. 
The University correctly notes that the Fourteenth Amendment protect individuals 
against state action, not private action. Nevertheless, the Act, while facially directed 
toward private parties, constitutes state action. 
It is indisputable that passage of the Act constitutes state action. It is commonly 
accepted that statutory provisions enacted by a state's legislature constitute one of the 
most fundamental forms of state action. See, e.g., Adam M. Silverman, Constitutional 
Law - Pennsylvania's Wrongful Birth Statute's Impact on Abortion Rights, 66 Temple L. 
Rev. 1087, 1105 n.122 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUIONAL 
LAW, 18-1 at 1688 ("If litigants challenge a federal or state statute , , , in a case where 
the validity of the statute is necessarily implicated, state action is obvious, and no formal 
inquiry into the matter is needed.")). Likewise, under the Casey Purpose Prong, passage 
of an act alone is sufficient to render a statute unconstitutional if its purpose was to place 
an obstacle in the path of a woman choosing an abortion. 
As shown above, the Legislature's intent - to prevent abortion - was not merely to 
affect the relationship between private parties, but was to impact a federally protected 
right. As one commentator noted, 
When the state intends for a statute to have an impermissible impact on 
constitutionally protected rights, the statute no longer regulates individual conduct 
alone. While the conduit for the state'a act may be a private individual - such as 
the physician in a wrongful life or birth suit - if the state intends for that individual 
to violate another's constitutional rights, it is if the state itself has acted. Passage 
and enforcement of such a statute therefore constitutes state action. 
Julie F. Kowitz, Not Your Garden Variety Tort Reform: Statutes Barring Claims for 
Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Are Unconstitutional Under the Purpose Prong of 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1995 Brooklyn L. Rev. 235, 261-262. 
The impairment to Borman/Wood's reproductive freedom was not simply a 
private injury inflicted by her physician. The Act undermined the University's legal duty 
to act in accordance with accepted medical malpractice. Such an act carries the imprint 
of the state and upsets the balance which medical malpractice strikes between the patient 
and her physician. This too is sufficient to constitute state action. Bowman v. Davis, 356 
N.E.2d 496,499 (Ohio 1976) ("For this court to endorse a policy that makes physicians 
liable for the foreseeable consequences of all negligently performed operations except 
those involving sterilization would constitute an impermissible infringement of a 
fundamental right."); See Kowitz at 263 n.136 and accompanying text. 
Finally, when the District Court enforced the Act, leaving Wood/Borman without 
remedy, the state affirmatively injected itself into the private patient/doctor relationship. 
Such action is state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (dismissing the proposition that no 
state action was involved when the state court applied a state rule of law in a civil 
lawsuit between two private parties); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,14 (1947) 
(recognizing that action of state courts in enforcing common law or statutory enactments 
"is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."). 
In short, the Act constitutes state action and therefore implicates the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the attendant Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 
VII. THE UNIVERSITY'S RELIANCE UPON MINNESOTA AND 
PENNSYLVANIA CASE LAW IS MISPLACED. 
The University argues that this Court should be persuaded by decisions in 
Minnesota and Pennsylvania that have upheld the constitutionality of wrongful birth 
statutes. Specifically, the University relies upon Edmonds v. Western Pennsylvania 
Hosp. Radiology Assoc, 607 A.2d 1083 (Pa. 1992), Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson 
University Hospital, 623 A.2d 816 (Pa. 1993) and Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 
396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986). For various reasons, these cases are irrelevant to a proper 
interpretation of the Act under both the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
First, both Hickman and Edmonds were decided prior to Casey. Likewise, the 
Dansby appeal was not brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Therefore, neither state court had the benefit of Casey or the understanding 
of the Purpose Prong of Casey. As shown previously, the Purpose Prong of Casey deals 
a devastating blow to the constitutionality of the Act under the Due Process Clause. 
Second, none of the cases dealt with an open courts clause as vigorous as Utah's. 
In Edmonds and Dansby, the issue was not raised. 607 A.2d at 1083, 1086-88; 623 A.2d 
at 821. In Hickman, the Court rejected the argument, essentially finding that unless a 
cause of action was recognized as far back as Eighteenth Century English common law, 
the Minnesota open courts clause would not apply. This holding is in direct contrast 
with this Court's repeated holdings. See, e.g., Day, 980 P.2d at 1183-85. 
Accordingly, neither the Pennsylvania nor Minnesota cases are applicable to this 
matter and the University's reliance thereon is flawed. 
VIII. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION AND INFORMED CONSENT ARE VIABLE 
CAUSES OF ACTION. 
The University incorrectly asserts that Wood/Borman's negligent infliction of 
emotional distress and failure to obtain informed consent causes of action depend upon 
the assertion that Wood/Borman would have aborted their fetus. As with the wrongful 
birth cause of action, the University simply fails to understand the injury and damages 
suffered by Wood/Borman. 
Wood/Borman's final two causes of action do not assert that "but for the act or 
omission of another, a person would not have been permitted to have been born alive but 
would have been aborted." The fundamental assertion in both causes of action2 is that the 
University failed to inform accurately Wood/Borman of their fetus' condition, which 
deprived them of the opportunity to make an informed decision, which resulted in 
emotional trauma at the time of birth and thereafter. As the Missouri Supreme Court 
noted, a cause of action exists where plaintiffs' assert that 
2
 The University argues that the failure to obtain informed consent cause of action should 
be dismissed because it does not meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-5 and 
that on this basis alone the District Court was justified in dismissing the claim. However, 
Wood/Borman's Complaint did make the necessary allegations, including, that the 
prenatal testing carried significant risk, that they were not informed and would not have 
consented. (R. 7-9). 
as a direct and proximate result of the negligence and carelessness of the 
defendants,... plaintiff was denied the right to choose whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy; and as a result thereof... plaintiff has suffered losses 
including loss of consortium, the right to lead a normal life; plaintiff has also 
suffered and will continue to suffer from emotional distress, anxiety and 
depression. 
Shelton v. St. Anthony's Medical Center, 781 S.W.2d 48,49. Wood/Borman's final two 
causes of action assert these identical elements and damages. 
Moreover, the University's claim that Utah has never recognized such damages is 
simply wrong. As noted earlier, in Nielson this Court held - in the wrongful pregnancy 
cause of action - that a mother was entitled to monetary compensation for the mental 
anguish associated with childbirth. In fact, this Court noted that "awarding these initial 
(non-child rearing) damages is likewise congruous with our cases concerning the 
recovery of damages in negligent malpractice actions." 767 P.2d at 509. The Nielson 
Court further noted that "damages which may be shown to follow as a proximate cause of 
the negligence include reasonable charges for discovery and repair of any resultant injury 
and monetary compensation for mental anguish." Id. 
In this matter, Wood/Borman were injured when they experienced the birth of 
their child, which they were promised and informed would be healthy. Such an injury is 
within the confines of negligent infliction of emotional distress and or informed consent 
and was certainly plead by Wood/Borman. This injury, and the measure of damages, is 
separate and distinct from any allegation that they would have aborted. Damages are also 
distinct from the life of the child. Accordingly, the Act does not bar the final two causes 
of action and the District Court erred when it dismissed them. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Act should be declared unconstitutional and this 
case remanded to the District Court. 
DATED this 20th day of August, 2001. 
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